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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. WHETHER THE COURT OP APPEALS ERRED IN 
REVERSING THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT GRANTED BY THE 
TRIAL COURT IN HOLDING THAT AN ISSUE OF FACT 
EXISTS AS TO THE RIGHTS OF THE RESPONDENTS AS 
GUARANTORS TO SUBROGATION TO THE COLLATERAL 
GIVEN AS SECURITY TO THE PETITIONER, VALLEY 
BANK AND TRUST COMPANY. 
2. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AS 
A MATTER OF LAW IN APPLYING PROVISIONS OF THE 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE TO THE GUARANTY 
AGREEMENT OF THE PETITIONER, VALLEY BANK AND 
TRUST COMPANY. 
OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The opinion of the Court of Appeals is contained at 64 
Utah Adv. Rep. 66, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "A," in 
the appendix to this brief. 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
The jurisdiction of this court to review a decision of 
the Court of Appeals under a petition for a writ of certiorari is 
conferred under Rule 42, R. Utah S. Ct., and under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2-2(5) (1986). The date of the entry of the decision of the 
Court of Appeals is September 1, 1987. 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, ROLES, REGULATION, ETC, 
Utah Code Ann, § 70A-3-102(l)(e)(1965) 
(1) In this chapter unless the context 
otherwise requires . . . 
(e) "Instrument" means a negotiable 
instrument. 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-606(l)(1965) Impairment 
of recourse or of collateral. 
(T) The holder discharges any party to 
the instrument to the extent that without such 
party's consent the holder 
(a) without express reservation of rights 
releases or agrees not to sue any person 
against whom the party has to the knowledge of 
the holder a right of recourse or agrees to 
suspend the right to enforce against such person 
the instrument or collateral or otherwise 
discharges such person, except that failure or 
delay in effecting any required presentment, 
protest or notice of dishonor with respect to 
any such person does not discharge any party as 
to whom presentment, protest or notice of 
dishonor is effective or unnecessary; or 
(b) unjustifiably impairs any collateral 
for the instrument given by or on behalf of the 
party or any person against whom he has a right 
of recourse, (emphasis added) 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(5)(1986) 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion 
in granting or denying a petition for writ of 
certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals 
adjudication, but the Supreme Court shall 
review those cases certified to it by the Court 
of Appeals under Subsection (3)(b). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Petitioner, Valley Bank and Trust Company ("Valley 
Bank" hereafter), appeals from the decision of the Court of 
Appeals (See Exhibit "A" in Appendix) which reverses and remands 
the granting of summary judgment by the trial court as to the 
liability of the Respondents, Peter Lowe, Jr. and Richard H. Lowe 
(collectively "Lowes" hereafter), as guarantors of the Promissory 
Note executed by Rite Way Concrete Forming, Inc• ("Rite Way" 
hereafter). 
Summary judgment was rendered by the Honorable Dean E. 
Conder on March 5, 1984. (See Exhibit "B" in the Appendix) The 
Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the awarding of summary 
judgment by the trial court. Valley Bank and Trust Company v. 
Rite Way Concrete Forming, Inc., et al., 64 Utah Adv. Rep. 66, 67 
(Ct. App. 1987) . 
STATEMENT OF PACTS 
Rite Way executed a Promissory Note - Security Agree-
ment, dated June 17, 1977, in the principal sum of $15,000, 
together with interest at 12.75$ per annum, payable in forty-
eight (48) equal monthly installments, beginning on July 24, 
1977. (R. 53, 54). The Promissory Note was secured by colla-
teral which included concrete forming equipment. Valley Bank v. 
Rite Way, 64 Utah Adv. Rep. at 67. 
On June 1, 1977, the Lowes executed guaranty agreements 
with Valley Bank guaranteeing the existing and future obligations 
of Rite Way with Valley Bank. (R. 57, 59). 
After execution of the note and security agreement, the 
Lowes conveyed all of their interest in Rite Way to Don Bailey 
Construction, Inc., ("Bailey") which assumed the $15,000 obli-
gation to Valley Bank. In connection with this transaction, Rite 
Way transferred ownership of the cement forming equipment to 
Bailey. Bailey subsequently subcontracted to do work for 
Jacobsen-Robbins Construction Company, a general contractor. Id. 
Upon Bailey's failure to complete the subcontract, it 
surrendered the concrete forming equipment to Jacobsen-Robbins 
and defaulted on the loan obligation to Valley Bank. Upon 
Bailey's default, Valley Bank sued and entered default judgment 
against Bailey. Judgment was not satisfied by Bailey because the 
corporation ceased doing business without satisfying the debt. 
Id. 
Valley Bank accelerated the note and demanded that the 
Lowes pay the balance of the obligation of $4,494.71 because of 
their personal guaranties. (R. 50-52) Lowes refused to pay the 
balance, but, instead, met with Valley Bank officers and offered 
to locate the collateral and assist with its repossession. Lowes 
asserted that they gave Valley Bank a specific description of the 
equipment and its location, and authorized Valley Bank to 
repossess it. Valley Bank never acquired actual physical 
control over the collateral. Id. 
On October 12, 1982, without the Lowes' awareness or 
consent, and reserving its rights against Rite Way, Valley Bank 
released its interest in the cement forms in Jacobsen-Robbins1 
possession after Jacobsen-Robbins notified Valley Bank that 
Conesco claimed ownership of the forms. •*• 
Valley Bank brought a successful motion for summary 
judgment against the Lowes. The trial court in a memorandum 
decision (R. 192-194) (see Exhibit "C" in Appendix) found the 
Lowes' guaranty was absolute and unconditional because it 
1 The Court of Appeals assumed the truthfulness of the Lowes' 
statement that these cement forms were substantially the same 
equipment described in Valley Bank's security agreement. 
Valley Bank v. Rite Way, 64 Utah Adv. Rep. at 67. 
provided that the guarantors "severally guarantee payment when 
due of any and all obligation of Borrowers to Bank when due or 
any and all obligations of Borrower to Bank now existing of which 
may hereafter arise of whatsoever nature and however represented, 
and whether secured or unsecured." (emphasis in original). Id. 
The trial court entered judgment in favor of Valley Bank for 
$4,494.71 principal, $1,884.78 interest, $2,800 attorneyTs fees 
and $51.50 court costs. 
ARGUMENT FOR ISSUANCE OP THE WRIT 
A writ of certiorari should be granted because the 
decision of the Court of Appeals decides a question of state law 
that is in conflict with prior decisions of this court. Under 
the decision, the Court of Appeals allows a claim for subrogation 
by a guarantor without having the guarantor first make payment of 
the underlying obligation. 
In addition, a writ of certiorari should also be 
granted because the Court of Appeals applies provisions of the 
Uniform Commercial Code that, as a matter of law, cannot be 
applied to Valley Bank's guaranty agreements with the Lowes as 
the agreements are not subject to the Uniform Commercial Code. 
POINT I 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVERSING THE 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT 
IN HOLDING THAT AN ISSUE OF FACT EXISTS AS 
TO LOWES1 RIGHTS OF SUBROGATION TO THE 
COLLATERAL GIVEN AS SECURITY TO VALLEY BANK. 
The Court of Appeals uses the analysis of Strevell-
Patterson Co. v. Francis, 646 P.2d 741 (Utah 1982), in holding 
that the Valley Bank guaranty agreement is an absolute guaranty 
of payment. Valley Bank v. Rite Way, 64 Utah Adv. Rep. at 68. 
The language in the guaranty agreement states as follows: 
"VALLEY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY," a corporation, 
hereinafter referred to as "Bank," has 
extended credit and/or agreed to extend credit 
and/or furnished or agreed to furnish other 
accomodations to the person hereinafter 
identified as "Borrower," and the undersigned 
Guarantors, in consideration of such credit 
and/or accomodations by Bank to Borrower 
jointly and severally guarantee payment when 
due of any and all obligations of Borrower to 
Bank now existing or which may hereafter arise 
of whatsoever nature and however represented, 
and whether secured or unsecured. (emphasis 
added) 
(Copies of the guaranty agreements are attached as Exhibit "D," 
in the Appendix) The Court of Appeals then states that the 
Lowes' liability for the loan with Valley Bank became fixed upon 
the default of the primary obligor, Bailey. Id. 
The Court of Appeals next addresses the issue of 
subrogation. The court states that a guarantor, upon payment of 
the guaranteed obligation, has a right of subrogation to any 
collateral pledged as security, (emphasis added) Ld. The Court 
of Appeals erred in reversing the summary judgment because it 
awards rights of subrogation to the Lowes, as guarantors, even 
though the Lowes never made payment on the guaranteed obli-
gation. The right of subrogration to the collateral does not 
exist until the Lowes make payment of the guaranteed obligation. 
The very legal sources cited by the Court of Appeals 
supports the rule that a guarantor does not have the right to 
subrogation and the corresponding right to the collateral given 
as security until the guarantor makes payment of the guaranteed 
obligation. See Behlen Mfg. Co. v. First National Bank, 28 Colo. 
Ct. App. 300, 472 P.2d 703, 706 (1970). The Court of Appeals 
relies upon this Colorado case throughout its analysis and yet 
fails to take into account the facts of the case. In Behlen 
Mfg. the guarantor first made payment of the underlying obli-
gation in order to have rights of subrogation. Id. 
Only when the guarantor makes payment of the guaranteed 
obligation do the rights of subrogation accrue. Valley Bank v. 
Rite Way, 64 Utah Adv. Rep. at 68. In the instant action, the 
Lowes did not pay the underlying obligation and therefore are 
not entitled to any claim for subrogation. The Court of Appeals 
fails to acknowledge this important rule of law and therefore 
gives the Lowes rights of subrogation to the collateral. 
The effect of the decision by the Court of Appeals on 
the issue of subrogation makes Valley Bank's guaranty agreement 
no longer an "unconditional" guaranty of payment but instead a 
"conditional" guaranty of collection. The Court of Appeals' 
analysis is inconsistent with this court's opinion in Strevell-
Patterson, supra, which sets forth the distinction between a 
guaranty of payment and a guaranty of collection. Because the 
Court of Appeals fails to properly apply the law with respect to 
subrogation, it errs in ruling that an issue of fact exists to 
preclude summary judgment from being affirmed on appeal. 
POINT II 
THE COURT OP APPEALS ERRED AS A MATTER OP LAW 
IN APPLYING PROVISIONS OP THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL 
CODE TO THE GUARANTY AGREEMENT OP VALLEY BANK. 
After analyzing the general rule of subrogation rights 
of a guarantor after it has made payment on the guaranteed 
obligation, the Court of Appeals then supports its conclusion by 
stating that the general rule has been codified in Utah in the 
Uniform Commercial Code and as contained at Utah Code Ann. 
§ 70A-3-606(l) (1980). Valley Bank v. Rite Way, 64 Utah Adv. Rep. 
at 68. The Court of Appeals references this particular section 
of the Uniform Commercial Code to establish that there are issues 
of fact that justify reversing the trial courtTs summary judgment 
In remanding the case to the trial court, the Court of Appeals 
also sets forth the issues for the trial court to review and 
specifically makes reference to the provisions of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, § 70A-3-606(l) (1980) . Id. 
The Court of Appeals erred in applying the Uniform 
Commercial Code to the guaranty agreement of Valley Bank. The 
guaranty agreements executed by the Lowes are dated June 1, 1977. 
(R. 57, 59). The Promissory Note - Security Agreement executed 
by Rite Way for the loan from Valley Bank is dated June 17, 1977. 
(R. 53, 5^). The guaranty agreements are not a part of nor are 
they the same document as the Promissory Note - Security 
Agreement. 
The Uniform Commercial Code sections referred to by the 
Court of Appeals, specifically § 70A-3-606(l), should not be 
applied to the guaranties executed by the Lowes. In order to 
apply the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code to the 
guaranty agreements, the "instrument" as referred to in 
§ 70A-3-606(l) must be a negotiable instrument as defined under 
§ 70A-3-102(l)(e). The guaranty agreements are not negotiable 
instruments but rather separate contracts of guarantee. This 
argument was raised to the Court of Appeals not only at oral 
argument but also in the briefs presented to the court. The 
Court of Appeals did not address the negotiability requirement. 
Numerous jurisdictions have held that a guaranty 
agreement of this nature is not a negotiable instrument but 
rather a separate contract of guarantee and, as such, the pro-
visions of the Uniform Commercial Code are not applicable. See, 
e.g., Crown Life Ins. Co. v. LaBonte, 111 Wis.2d 26, 330 N.W.2d 
201 (1983); Halpin v. Frankenberger, 231 Kan. 344, 644 P.2d 452, 
456 (1982); Kansas State Bank and Trust Co. v. DeLorean, 7 
Kan.App.2d 246, 640 P.2d 343, 350 (1982); First Nat. Bank of 
Albuquerque v. Energy Eg- Inc., 91 N.M. 11, 569 P.2d 421, 426 
(1977). 2 
The Court of Appeals erred in applying the provisions 
of the Uniform Commercial Code to the Valley Bank guaranty 
agreement. The code provisions do not apply to a guaranty 
agreement that is not by itself a negotiable instrument. 
2 
The Utah Supreme Court has addressed the use of the 
provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code to a guaranty 
agreement in Continental Bank and Trust Co. v. Utah Security 
Mortgage, Inc., et al., 701 P.2d 1095 (Utah 19«5). In that 
decision the court never addresses the argument that the 
provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code were not 
applicable to the guaranty agreement of Continental Bank and 
Trust Company. 
CONCLUSION 
As a matter of law the Court of Appeals erred in its 
decision. A right of subrogation does not exist for a guarantor 
until the underlying debt has been paid. The Lowes never paid 
the underlying obligation to entitle them to rights of sub-
rogation to the collateral. Furthermore, as a matter of law, the 
Court of Appeals erred in applying the provisions of the Uniform 
Commercial Code to the guaranty agreement of Valley Bank. The 
agreement is not a negotiable instrument to be included within 
the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code. Petitioner, 
Valley Bank and Trust Company, respectfully requests that a writ 
of certiorari be granted. 
DATED this j?cJ day of September, 1987. 
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH 
Pkal D. Veasy (JN> 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
APPENDIX 
the certificates in this form [was] a tacit acq-
uiescence in, and submission to, the bylaw." Id. 
The court concluded: 
We know of no rule of law which 
forbids stock-holders to form with 
each other a convention of this 
nature. It is not forbidden by the 
terms of the charter, and certainly 
cannot be held to be against public 
policy .... [Although the silence of 
the lawgiver in a particular charter, 
is a strong argument against the 
implication of such a power as an 
incident to the administration of the 
corporation,4 it is no reason for 
frustrating the wishes and agree-
ment . of the stockholders themse-
lves. 
Id. at 317-18. See also W. Fletcher, Cyclo-
pedia of the Law of Private* Corporations, 
§1858 (rev. perm. ed. 1985). 
In more recent cases, courts have reiterated 
the nature and effect of bylaws. In Dentel v. 
Fidelity Sav. and Loan Assoc, 539 P.2d 649 
(Or. 1975), the Supreme Court of Oregon 
held, "The bylaws of the corporation have 
been termed a contract between the members 
of the corporation, and between the corpora-
tion and its members." Id. at 650-51. The 
Court of Appeals of Oregon added, *[A]n 
invalid bylaw can be enforced as a contract. 
There are two principal limitations on the 
enforcement of an invalid bylaw as a contract. 
First, such indirect enforcement is only poss-
ible against a stockholder who has assented to 
the bylaw ... [and second] the substance of the 
bylaw must not be inconsistent with public 
policy." Jones v. Wallace, 616 P.2d 575, 577 
(Or.App. 1980).: 
Under the foregoing analysis, article 12 of 
the bylaws was perhaps invalid as a matter of 
general corporate law since it arguably allowed 
for forfeiture of stock without charter autho-
rization. Nevertheless, summary judgment 
shall be granted only if the evidence before the 
court shows "there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Utah 
R. Civ. P. 56(c). As a matter of contract law, 
several material issues of fact'.exist which 
preclude entry of partial summary judgment. 
Was there a contract between the parties? 
Plaintiff argues the bvlaws were never signed 
or adopted nor did he or.McBride ever agree 
to them.3 Defendants argue
 4 all the parties 
agreed to the bylaws. What do the ambiguous 
provisions of the bylaw/contract mean? At 
trial, defendants argued plaintiffs stock aut-
omatically reverted .upon termination of his 
employment with Dalbo, Inc. If so, why did 
defendants negotiate with plaintiff to purchase 
his stock and why was McBride paid for his? 
On appeal, defendants argue article 12 did not 
provide for a forfeiture, but rather a buy-sell 
agreement. Another interpretation of article 12 
is that it created a condition precedent, i.e, 
three years of employment, to the vesting of 
stockholder status. Such ambiguity creates a 
material issue of fact, see Seashores Inc. v. 
Hancey, 738 P.2d 645 (Utah App. 1987), and 
highlights the difficulty in resolving the case 
on summary judgment. 
We hold the trial court erred in granting 
plaintiffs motion for partial summary judg-
ment and we reverse. Since the partial 
summary judgment set into play the entire 
chain of subsequent proceedings, we also 
reverse all subsequent orders and judgments 
and remand the case for trial. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
1. "Any person who is a shareholder of record, 
upon written demand stating the purpose thereof, 
shall have the right to examine, in person, or by 
agent or attorney, at any reasonable time or times, 
for any proper purpose, its books and records of 
account, minutes and record of shareholders and to 
make extracts therefrom. A proper purpose means a 
purpose reasonably related to the person's interest 
as a shareholder." 
2. "Any officer or agent who, or a corporation 
which, shall refuse to allow any such shareholder, or 
his agent or attorney, so to examine and make ext-
racts from its books and records of account, 
minutes, and record of shareholders, for any proper 
purpose, shall be liable to such shareholder in a 
penalty of 1097o of the value of the shares owned by 
such shareholder, in addition to any other damages 
or remedy afforded him by law; but no such penalty 
shall exceed 55,000/ 
3. Bylaws need not be signed to be adopted. Marsh 
v. Mathias, 19 Utah 350,56 P. 1074 (1899). 
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VALLEY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation 
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v. 
RITE WAY CONCRETE FORMING, INC., 
a Utah corporation, Peter Lowe, Jr. J. 
Randall Outsen, Tracy M. Jones. Richard H. 
Lowe, and Don Bailey Construction, Inc., a 
Utah corporation, 
Defendants, 
and 
Peter Lowe, Jr., and Richard H. Lowe, 
Cross-Complainants, Third-Party 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
Don Bailey Construction, Inc., a Utah 
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corporation, 
Cross-Defendants and Respondents, 
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Don Bailey, Draper Bank, a Utah corporation, 
and Jacobsen-Robbins Construction 
Company, Inc., a Utah corporation, 
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Before Judges Orme, Davidson and Garff. 
No. 860018-CA 
FILED: September 1,1987 
THIRD DISTRICT 
Honorable Dean £. Conder 
ATTORNEYS: 
Arthur H. Nielsen, Richard Hincks for 
Jacobsen-Robbins. 
Dwight L. King for Draper Bank. 
Arthur F. Sandack for Tracy Jones. 
K. L. Mclff for Lowes. 
Paul D. Veasy, W. Jeffery Fillmore for Valley 
Bank. 
OPINION 
GARFF, Judge: 
Defendants Peter Lowe, Jr. and Richard H. 
Lowe appeal from a summary judgment in 
favor of plaintiff Valley Bank and Trust 
(Bank) finding defendants liable as guarantors 
of a promissory note executed by Rite Way 
Concrete Forming, Inc. (Rite Way) and awa-
rding plaintiff attorney fees. We remand for 
hearing consistent with this opinion. 
Rite Way executed a promissory note for 
$15,000.00 at 12.75Vo interest per annum in 
favor of the Bank for the purpose of purcha-
sing concrete forming equipment from 
Conesco, a concrete forming equipment sup-
plier. This note was secured by collateral 
consisting of the concrete forming equipment 
and a 1977 Chevrolet two-ton flat-bed 
truck, and by the personal guarantees of 
several persons, including Peter and Richard 
Lowe. 
After execution of the note and the security 
agreements, the Lowes conveyed all of their 
interest in Rite Way to Don Bailey Construc-
tion;- Inc. (Bailey), which assumed the 
$15,000.00 obligation to the Bank. In conne-
ction with this transaction, Rite Way transfe-
rred ownership of the flat-bed truck and the 
cement forming equipment to Bailey> .which 
subsequently subcontracted to do work for 
Jacobsen-Robbins. Construction Co., a 
general contractor. Upon Bailey's failure to 
satisfactorily complete the subcontract, it 
surrendered the secured equipment to Jaco-
bsen-Robbins and defaulted on the loan 
obligation to the Bank. Upon Bailey's default, 
the Bank sued and entered default judgment 
against it. However, Don Bailey, the corporate 
owner, disappeared and the corporation ceased 
For complete Utah Code Annotations, 
doing business without satisfying the debt. 
The Bank then accelerated the note and 
demanded that the Lowes pay the entire 
balance of $4,494.71 because of their personal 
guaranties. The Lowes refused to pay the 
balance, but, instead, met with Bank officers 
and offered to locate the collateral and assist 
with its repossession. They spent a consider-
able amount of time and effort doing so, and 
allege that they succeeded in locating virtually 
all of the secured equipment on the Jacobsen-
Robbins job sitesc They also assert that they 
gave the Bank a specific description of the 
equipment and its location, and authorized the 
Bank to repossess it. For purposes of revie-
wing this summary judgment, we review the 
facts and inferences in the light most favorable 
to the Lowes. Atlas Corp, v. Clovis Nat'l 
Bank, 737 P.2d 225,229 (Utah 1987). 
Although the Bank never acquired actual 
physical control over the collateral, it is 
unclear whether it had the opportunity or the 
right to do so. On October 12, 1982, without 
the Lowes' awareness or consent, and reser-
ving its rights against Rite Way,1 the Bank 
released its interest in the cement forms in 
Jacobsen-Robbins' possession after Jacobsen-
Robbins notified the Bank that Conesco 
claimed ownership of the forms. Under the 
summary judgment standard of review, we 
assume the truthfulness of the Lowes' state-
ment that these cement forms were substanti-
ally the same equipment described in the sec-
urity agreement. As a consequence of this 
release, the Bank was unable to satisfy the 
loan balance from the collateral. 
The Bank brought a successful motion for 
summary judgment against the Lowes. The 
trial court in a memorandum decision found 
that the Lowes' guaranty was absolute and 
unconditional because it provided that the 
guarantors "severally guarantee payment when 
due of any and all obligations of Borrowers to 
Bank when due or any and all obligations of 
Borrower to Bank now existing or which may 
hereafter arise of whatsoever nature and 
however represented, and whether secured or 
unsecured0 (emphasis in original). 
The trial court entered judgment in favor of 
the Bank for $4,494.71 principal, $1,884.78 
interest, $2,800.00 attorneys' fees, and $51.50 
court costs. 
The * Lowes raise the following issues on 
appeal: (1) In releasing the collateral, did the 
Bank discharge the Lowes from their guaranty 
agreements? (2) Was the award of attorney 
fees against the Lowes improper? 
L 
The first issue is whether the Lowes were 
discharged from their guaranty agreements 
when the Bank released the collateral securing 
the loan. 
Whether a creditor has a duty to pursue the 
debtor or the collateral securing the loan as a 
onsnlt Code • Co's Annotation Service 
precondition to pursuing the guarantor 
clepends "on the nature of the guarantor's 
promise." Strevell-Paterson Co. v. Francis, 
046 P.2d 741, 743 (Utah 1982)(quoting West-
jnghouse Credit Corp. v. Hydroswift Corp., 
« 8 P.2d 156,158 (Utah 1974)). 
The nature of the guarantor's promise 
clepends upon whether it is absolute or cond-
itional. An absolute guaranty is defined as: 
a contract by which the guarantor 
has promised that if the debtor does 
not perform his obligation or obli-
gations, the guarantor will perform 
some act (such as the payment of 
<noofity\ ta <K Cat th& heasftt QC th& 
creditor .... A guaranty of the 
payment of 'an obligation, without 
words of limitation or condition, is 
construed as an absolute or unco-
nditional guaranty. 
28 Am. Jur. 2d Guaranty § 21 (1968). This 
unconditional obligation, sometimes referred 
( o a s a guaranty of payment, holds the guar-
antor liable, without notice, upon the default 
Of the principal. Mack Fin. Corp. v. Scott, 
100 Idaho 889, 606 P.2d 993, 998 (1980). Such 
t guaranty is "absolute, and the guaranteed 
party need not fix its losses by pursuing its 
remedies against the debtor or the security 
pefore proceeding directly against the guara-
ntor/ Strevell-Paterson Co. v. Francis, 646 
f.2dat743. 
On the other hand, a conditional guaranty, 
or guaranty of collection, is an obligation to 
pay or perform if payment or performance 
cannot be first reasonably obtained from the 
principal obligor. Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in StreveU-
paterson, found that the guaranty contract at 
issue was an absolute guaranty of payment 
gather than a guaranty of collection, because it 
'contained no express or implied condition on 
liability and no contractual requirement that 
the creditor seek satisfaction elsewhere before 
commencing action on the guarantee/ Id. at 
•743-44. 
Likewise, the present guaranty contract 
contains language that indicates that it is an 
absolute guaranty of payment rather than only 
£ guaranty of collection: 
"VALLEY BANK AND TRUST 
COMPANY/ a corporation, here-, 
inafter referred to as "Bank", has 
€x\enfo6 cit&\ an&DT agite&, to 
extend credit and/or furnished, or 
agreed to furnish other accomoda-
tions to the person hereinafter ide-
ntified as "Borrower", and the 
undersigned Guarantors, in consi-
deration of such credit and/or 
accomodations by Bank to Borr-
ower jointly and severally guarantee 
payment when due of, any and all 
obligations of Borrower to Bank 
now existing or which may hereafter 
arise of whatsoever nature and 
however represented, and whether 
secured or unsecured (Emphasis 
added). 
As in Strevell-Paterson, there are no add-
itional clauses stating an "express or implied 
condition on liability/ nor is there a contra-
ctual requirement that the creditor seek satis-
faction elsewhere on the guaranty. See Strevell-
Paterson, 646 P.2d at 744. Therefore, the 
Lowes' liability for the loan became fixed 
upon the default of the primary obligor, Don 
Bailey. 
However, a guarantor, upon payment of the 
guaranteed obligation, has a right of subrog-
ation to any collateral pledged as security. 
Behlen Mfg. Co. v. First National Bank, 28 
Colo. Ct. App. 300, 472 P.2d 703, 706 (1970); 
D. W. Jaquays & Co. v. First Security Bank, 
101 Ariz. 301, 419 P.2d 85, 89 (1966). This is 
true even of an absolute guarantor. This right 
to subrogation is a "creature of equity/ whose 
"purpose is the prevention of injustice and is 
the mode which equity adopts to compel the 
ultimate payment of a debt by one who in 
justice, equity, and good conscience ought to 
pay it." Behlen Mfg. Co., All P.2d at 707 
(quoting D. W. Jaquays & Co., 419 P.2d at 
88). The rationale is that the creditor, having 
elected to proceed against security for payment 
of the debt, is deemed to be in a trustee rela-
tionship with the guarantor. The creditor may 
liquidate the security and apply the proceeds 
to the obligation, or he may forego recourse 
to the security and proceed against the guar-
antor of payment, provided he does not 
subvert the guarantor's subrogation rights 
against collateral pledged by the principal 
obligor. If he breaches that trust duty by 
destroying, losing, or otherwise improvidently 
dissipating the collateral, he may not hold the 
guarantor wholly liable because the guarantor 
would have been subrogated to the creditor's 
right of resort to that security. 38 Am. Jur. 2d 
|\ Guaranty § 84 (1968). Thus, where a cred-
jitor's actions impair the value of collateral in 
|) its possession which secures an obligation 
guaranteed by a guarantor, either absolute or 
conditional, the guarantor will be discharged 
from his obligation to the extent of the imp-
airment. Mack Fin. Corp. v. Scott, 606 P.2d 
at 998. 
This general rule has been codified in Utah 
through the Uniform Commercial Code. Utah 
Code Ann. § 70A-3-606(l)(1980) states: 
The holder discharges any party to 
the instrument to the extent that 
without such party's consent the 
holder ... (b) unjustifiably impairs 
any collateral for the instrument 
given by or on behalf of- the party 
or any person against whom he has 
For complete Utmh Code Annotitioiis, consult Code*Go's Annotation Service 
rrovu, vum 
a right of recourse. 
Appellants rely on this general rule to 
support their argument that they should escape 
liability on their guaranty contracts because 
the Bank's release of the collateral was unju-
stified. 
However, as an exception to this general 
rule, an absolute guarantor may explicitly 
waive his rights against collateral. Under the 
language of Section 70A-3-606(l)(b), the 
holder does not discharge a party to the inst-
rument if the party consents to allow the 
holder to impair the collateral. Thus, a finding 
that the guarantors so consented renders 
Section 3-606 discharge unavailable even if 
the holder unjustifiably impairs the collateral. 
The Official Comment to Section 3-606 of 
the Uniform Commercial Code indicates that 
such consent may be given in advance in the 
guaranty agreement: 
Consent may be given in advance, 
and is commonly incorporated in 
the instrument. It requires no con-
sideration, and operates as a waiver 
of the consenting party's right to 
claim his own discharge. 
See also National Acceptance Co. of America 
v. Demes, 446 F. Supp. 388, 390 (D. 111. 
1977). 
Such consent must be explicit and "should 
only be by the most unequivocal language in 
the guaranty agreement." Behlen Mfg. Co., 
All P.2d at 708 (quoting D. W. Jaquays & 
Co., 419 P.2d at 89); See also Mack Fin. 
Corp., 606 P.2d at 1000. 
For example, an explicit contract was found 
in Joe Heaston Tractor & Implement Co. v. 
Sec. Acceptance Corp., 243 F.2d 196, 198 n.l 
(10th Cir. 1957): 
The undersigned grants to the 
Finance Company full power to 
modify or change terms of any of 
the Liabilities, to agree to forbear-
ance with respect thereto, to 
consent to the substitution or exc-
hange or release of collateral 
thereto, and extension of time of 
payment of the Liabilities. 
Likewise, the guaranty agreement in Nati-
onal Acceptance Co. of America v. Demes, 
446 F. Supp. at 390, was found to be an 
unequivocal waiver of rights against collateral. 
The undersigned hereby waive 
notice of the following events or 
occurrences: ... the holder's obtai-
ning, amending, substituting or 
releasing, waiving, or modifying 
any ... security interests, liens, or 
encumbrances; [or] ... the holder's 
... hereafter accepting ... any coll-
ateral securing the payment ... or 
said holder's settling, subordina-
ting, compromising, discharging, or 
releasing the same. The undersigned 
agree that the holder of the Note 
may ... do any or all of the foreg-
oing events or occurrences in such 
manner, upon such terms and at 
such times as said holder, in its sole 
and absolute discretion, deems 
advisable, without in any way or 
respect impairing, affecting, redu-
cing, or releasing the undersigned 
from their obligations hereunder .... 
Id. See also Schauss v. Garner, 590 P.2d 1316 
(Wyo. 1979). 
In contrast, the court in Behlen Mfg. Co. 
found that language in the guaranty agreement2 
did not meet this test because "the only 
waiver in the guaranty agreement [had] to do 
with notice of nonpayment, protest, extension 
of the note and partial payment. There [was] 
no waiver relating to the collateral. The inde-
mnity agreement is limited to expense, loss or 
damage incurred in accepting the collateral or 
incurred in enforcing collection." Id. at 708, 
(emphasis added). See also Mack Fin. Corp. v. 
Scott, 100 Idaho 889, 606 P.2d 993, 1000 
(1980). 
Similarly, the Arizona court, in Jaquays, 
found that guarantors' subrogation rights 
were not impaired because consent to impair 
the collateral was not explicitly given, stating 
that the following language was insufficient to 
constitute an unequivocal waiver of rights 
against the collateral: "and in connection 
therewith consents without notice to any ext-
ensions or forbearance by assignee, and waives 
any demand or notice of default." Jaquays, 
419P.2dat88. 
In the present case, there are no explicit 
waivers of rights against collateral in the 
Lowes' guaranty agreements. The only lang-
uage which could be remotely construed to be 
a waiver of rights against collateral states that 
the Lowes "jointly and severally guarantee 
payment when due of any and all obligations 
of Borrower to Bank now existing or which 
may hereafter arise of whatsoever nature and 
however represented, whether secured or 
unsecured." 
In interpreting this language, we recognize 
that ian instrument purporting* to establish 
liability against a guarantor must be construed 
strictly, and any ambiguities must be resolved 
against the drafter of the instrument. National 
Acceptance Co, of America v. Demes, 446 F. 
Supp. at 391. This present language deals with 
the guarantors' liability for any loans made to 
the debtor, whether secured or unsecured, not 
with any waiver relating to collateral. Const-
rued strictly against the Bank, it does not 
explicitly waive any. subrogation rights to 
collateral. 
Therefore, assuming the Bank had control 
over the collateral, as the Lowes contend, we 
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conclude that it had a duty to preserve the 
Lowes' interest in the property held as secu-
rity and that performance of this duty was not 
waived by the Lowes' unconditional guaran-
ties because the Lowes did not expressly 
consent to impairment of the collateral. See 
Jaquays, 419 P.2d at 89. 
Whether the Lowes can prevail, however, 
depends upon two factors: If the forms which 
the Lowes found were the actual collateral 
and, if so, whether the Bank had control over 
them.3Further, a guarantor is released from 
his liability only to the extent of the injury 
caused by the failure of the creditor to protect 
his security interest, if the creditor was in 
control of the property held as security. Utah 
Code Ann. §70A-3-606(l)(1980); see 
Jaquays, 419 P.2d at 89; Mack Fin. Corp. v. 
Scott, 606 P.2d at 998. 
Since there are genuine issues of material 
fact as to whether the Bank had control over 
the collateral and whether the forms released 
by the Bank were, in fact, the collateral sec-
uring the note guaranteed by the Lowes, the 
summary judgment must be set aside. Atlas, 
737 P.2d at 229. This conclusion renders any 
discussion concerning disposition of the coll-
ateral in a commercially reasonable manner 
unnecessary. 
II. 
The -second issue raised by appellants was 
whether the award of $2,800 in attorney fees 
was proper. It is undisputed that the Lowes 
were liable for attorney fees.4 What is at issue 
is the amount of the fee. 
On February 24, 1984, Veasy, the Bank's 
counsel, filed an affidavit in support of atto-
rney fees with the court, but failed to serve a 
copy on Mclff, counsel for the Lowes. Mclff 
received, on Feb. 27, 1984, a copy of the 
proposed judgment from Veasy which indic-
ated that the Lowes were liable for $2,800 in 
attorney fees. He called Veasy that day to 
inform him of the lack of affidavits or docu-
mentation supporting the award of attorney 
fees and, on Feb. 28, 1984, filed an affidavit 
alleging that the attorney fee award was exc-
essive and the supporting affidavit was not 
timely filed. * 
The trial court entered judgment on March 
5, 1984, for $4,494.71 principal, $1,884.78 
interest, $2,800 attorney fees, and $51.50 court 
costs. Mclff stated that "he finally received '^a 
copy of the affidavit in support of attorney 
fees on March 7,4984, and, on the same day, 
filed a motion in opposition to plaintiffs 
affidavit in support of attorney fees. On April 
4, 1984, Mclff filed an affidavit in which, he 
brought these facts again to the court's atte-
ntion. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that 
"[ejven if there .were no disputed issue of 
material fact, the summary judgment cannot 
award an attorney's fee without a stipulation 
as to the amount, an unrebutted affidavit, or 
evidence given as to the value thereof." Freec 
Fin. Co. v. Stoker Motor Co., 537 P.2d 1039 
1040 (Utah 1975). In the instant case, there 
was not only a lapse of due process in that 
judgment was entered before appellant had an 
opportunity to see and respond to respon-
dent's affidavit on attorney fees, but appell-
ants rebutted respondent's affidavit. Accord-
ingly, the award of attorney fees was impr 
oper. Since the judgment appealed from h 
reversed, the award of attorney fees falls a< 
well, and fresh consideration of the attorney 
fee question will, of course, be appropriate. 
Reversed and remanded for trial consistent 
with this opinion. 
R. W. Garff, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
1. The Bank's release stated that "[b]y disclaimiiv 
any interest in and to the forms set forth as descr 
ibed herein, Valley Bank and Trust Company doe 
not release or waive any right under its Seamr 
Interest and Financing Statement with Rite-Wa^ 
Concrete Forming, Inc., Debtor,..." 
2. The specific provisions in the guaranty agreemen 
were as follows: Behlen agreed "to fully indemnify 
and .save the Bank harmless against all expense, loss 
damage or injury arising in connection with tht 
above note, or in the acceptance of any collatera 
therefor, or which may be incurred in enforcing 
collection of the same .... " Behlen Mfg. Co., 411 
P.2dat706. 
3. The Bank conceded, for purposes of this appeal 
only, that it had such control. Our decision in no 
way precludes the Bank from proving at trial that it 
in fact, had no such control. 
4. The relevant portion of the loan contract states 
*[a]U costs and expenses of Bank, in retaking 
holding, preparing for sale and selling or otherwist 
realizing upon the collateral in the event of defaul 
by Borrower, including court costs and reasonable 
attorney's fees and legal expenses, shall constitute 
additional indebtedness of the Borrower securec 
hereby which the borrower promises to pay or 
demand." The Guaranty agreement is in accord 
"Each Guarantor agrees to pay all costs and expe 
nses, including reasonable attorney's fees incurrec 
in enforcing this agreement." 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
VALLEY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RITE WAY CONCRETE FORMING, 
INC., a Utah corporation, 
PETER LOWE JR., J. RANDALL 
OUTSEN, TRACY M. JONES, 
RICHARD H. LOWE and DON 
BAILEY CONSTRUCTION, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendants. 
PETER LOWE, JR., and 
RICHARD H. LOWE, 
vs. 
Cross-complainants and 
Third-party P la in t i f f s , 
L niiTSEW, TRAGY H, « § , 
DON BAILEY CONSTRUCTION, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Cross-defendants, 
and 
DON BAILEY, DRAPER BANK, a 
Utah corporation, and 
JUDGMENT 
C i v i l No. C-81-487 
EXHIBIT NO. 
JACOBSEN-ROBBINS CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, INC., a Utah corporation, 
Third-party Defendants. 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing on 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment against Defendants, Rite Way 
Concrete Forming, Inc., Peter Lowe, Jr., and Richard H. Lowe, before the 
Honorable Dean E. Conder, Judge of the above-entitled Court on the 14th day 
of February, 1984, at the hour of 1:00 p.m. 
Plaintiff appeared by and through its counsel, Paul D. Veasy of 
Biele, Haslam & Hatch. The Defendants, Rite Way Concrete Forming, Inc., 
Peter Lowe, Jr., and Richard H. Lowe, appeared by and through their 
counsel, K. L. Mclff of Jackson, Mclff & Mower. The Court having consi-
dered the evidence presented by counsel, being fully advised in the 
premises, and having rendered its Memorandum Decision on file herein: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
Plaintiff is awarded Judgment jointly and severally against the 
Defendants, Rite Way Concrete Forming, Inc., Peter Lowe, Jr., and Richard 
H. Lowe, for the principal sum of $4,494.71, accrued interest in the sum of 
$1,884.78 calculated to February 14, 1984, together with interest on said 
Judgment at the rate of 12.75% per annum until paid, reasonable attorney's 
fee in the amount of $2,800, and costs of Court incurred herein in the sum 
of $51.50. 
DATED this £> day of"FStm*ary, 1984. 
BY THE COURT: 
DEAN E. CONDER 
District Court Judge 
BY 
A TTT3T 
FILMED 
FILuD ,./CLERK'S OFFICE 
Cn!t Lake County. Utah 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
VALLEY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, 
a U tah c o r p o r a t i o n , 
P l a i n t i f f , 
v s . . 
RITE WAY CONCRETE FORMING, 
INC., a Utah corporation, 
OUTSEN, TRACY M. JONES, 
RICHARD H. LOWE, and DON 
BAILEY CONSTRUCTION, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendants 
and 
PETER LOWE, JR. and 
RICHARD H. LOWE, 
Cros s-complainants 
and Third-party 
Plaintiffs, 
vs 
DON BAILEY CONSTRUCTION, 
INC. , a Utah corporation, 
Cross-defendants, 
and 
DON BAILEY, DRAPER BANK, a 
U t a h c o r p o r a t i o n , a n d 
JACOBSEN-ROBBINS CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, I N C . , a U t a h 
c o r p o r a t i o n . 
T h i r d - p a r t y 
D e f e n d a n t s . 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. C 8 1 - 4 8 7 
EXHIBIT NO. "c. 
VALLEY BANK, ET AL V. 
RITE WAY CONCRETE, ET AL PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment against defendants 
and garantors Peter M. Lowe, Jr. and Richard H. Lowe is hereby 
granted. The "Guaranty" executed by each of the parties is an 
absolute and unconditioned guarantee in that it provides that the 
Guarantors "...severally guarantee payment when due of any and all 
obligations of Borrowers to Bank now existing or which may hereafter 
arise of whatsoever nature and however represented, and whether 
secured or unsecured". (Emphasis added) 70A-3-416(l) UCA 1953 
provides, "'Payment guaranteed1 or equivalent words added to a 
signature mean that the signer engages that if the instrument is not 
paid when due he will pay it according to its tenor without resort 
by the holder to any other party". Using this analogy of the UCA to 
the guaranty, the court finds that the plaintiff has a cause of 
action against these defendants without first exhausting any remedies 
it has against the primary obligor. Furthermore, the Guaranty was 
effective whether or not the obligation was secureid or unsecured. 
Defendants Lowe argue that they located the security for the 
benefit of the plaintiff and by reason of plaintiff's "release" and 
failure to take possession of the security the plaintiff cannot pur-
sue its action against these defendants. Two things are against 
this: (1) The guaranty signed by these defendants provides that they 
are obligated on the loan "whether secured or unsecured"; also (2) 
The case of Dunser v. Southeast First National Bank of Miami, 367 
So. 2d 1094 (1979) states the law as follows: 
VALLEY BANK, ET AL V. 
RITE WAY CONCRETE, ET AL PAGE THREE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
"Finally, a most peirsuasive argument against 
reversal in the instant cause is the well-established 
principle that under an absolute and unconditional con-
tract of guaranty, as is the subject matter of this 
appeal, it is no defense that the creditor has lost 
security or has been negligent in regard to protection 
of the collateral. Fegley v. Jennings, 44 Fla. 203, 32 
So. 873 (1902) and A & T Motors, Inc. v. Roemelmeyer, 
158 So.2d 567 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964)." 
The third-party defendant, Jacobsen-Robbins, has also 
filed a motion for summary judgment against the third party plain-
tiffs, Lowe. At the hearing on this matter the third-party plain-
tiffs, Lowe, moved to dismiss its third-party complaint. Motion 
is granted without prejudice. 
Dated this / 5> day of February, 1984. 
DEAN E. CONDER, DISTRICT JUDGE 
* *~ *~i 
GUARANTY 
VALLEY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, a corporat ion, hereinafter referred to as " B a n k " , has extended credit and 
agreed to extend credit a n d / o r furnished or agreed to furnish other accommodations to the person hereinafter ident i f ied 
"Bor rower " , and the undersigned Guarantors, in consideration of such credit a n d / o r accommodations by Bank to Borrov 
joint ly and severally guarantee payment when due of any and al l obl igat ions of Borrower to Bank now existing or wh 
may hereafter arise of whatsoever nature and however represented, and whether secured or unsecured. 
This agreement is continuing in nature, it being specifically understood that unless indicated to the contrary at the e 
hereof, the agreement is to encompass future accommodations and indebtednesses of Borrower as wel l as existing indebt* 
nesses of Borrower, and that any obl igat ions or indebtednesses may be changed, modi f ied, increased, renewed, paid 
reinstated, a l l wi thout notice to the Guarantors or any of them. The l iabi l i ty of any Guarantor for future advances, cred 
or accommodations granted by Bank to Borrower may be terminated by such Guarantor by furnishing writ ten notice 
such terminat ion and , a l though this agreement remains in ful l force and effect as to then extant obl igat ions of Borrow 
thereby a l low ing Bank to extend, modify or renew such extant obl igat ions, Guarantor shall not be l iable for new advan ' 
or addi t ional credits furnished to Borrower subsequent to the date the notice is received by the Bank. This Guaranty sh 
remain in ful l force and effect until terminated in wr i t ing even though from time to rime there may be no obl igat ion I 
tween the Borrower and the Bank. 
This agreement is severable as to each Guarantor, it being specifically understood that no one Guarantor is relyi 
upon the obl igat ions of any other Guarantor, and Bank may release or modify this agreement in relat ion to the ob l iga tk 
of one or more Guarantors wi thout affect ing the l iabi l i ty of any other Guarantor. 
Each Guarantor agrees that his Guaranty is binding upon him without the signature of any other person or the ex 
tence of any other Guaranty and that a termination notice served by any other Guarantor shall not affect the l iabi l i ty 
any other Guarantor. 
Each Guarantor agrees to pay al l costs and expenses, including reasonable attorney's fees incurred in enforcing t 
agreement. 
Each Guarantor waives notice of any matter, defaul t , presentment, demand, protest or dishonor between the Borrow 
and Bank and agrees that any notice furnished to Borrower shall be deemed as being furnished to each Guarantor. Not: 
is wa ived of acceptance hereof by Bank. 
This instrument shall be b inding upon the heirs, personal representatives, successors and assigns of the Guarantor c 
shall inure to the benefit of the Bank, its successors and assigns. This contract is assignable in who le or in part without not 
to Guarantors. This wr i t ing contains the entire agreement of the parties. The undersigned specifically submits himself 
the jurisdiction of the District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and agrees that the laws of the State of Utah sh 
govern this contract. If the undersigned is wi thout the terri torial jurisdiction of such Court at the time Bank institutes a 
action thereon, then service of process from such Court served on the undersigned, regardless of where undersigned is 
cated, a l low ing sixty (60 ) days to answer such process shall be the only condit ion to the exercise of such jurisdiction 
said Court, the undersigned consenting to and submitt ing to such jurisdiction. 
A notice to a Guarantor w i l l be deemed complete two (2) days after being placed in the United States Ma i l , posta 
prepaid, addressed to the Guarantor at the address indicated after the Guarantor 's signature. 
The l iabi l i ty of each Guarantor is unlimited as to amount unless a l imitat ion is indicated immediately in advance 
Guarantor 's signature, whereupon the guarantee as to that Guarantor is l imited to the indicated amount. 
The Borrower hereinafter referred to is . . . . l ^ . i . ~ . g . _ T . . \ ^ A - Y - - . - - . < i l « ^ an more th? 
one Borrower is indicated, the reference "Bor rower " in this agreement is joint and several. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF and by authority duly vested, the undersigned have caused this agreement to be executed 
of this . / - . day of ,-j.a/Us:. , 19:2.7 
GUARANTORS: 
Limit: U ^ ^ i M i T g f . Limit: 
t^^^jsL-JL. . t«c _ 
Guarantor / Guarantor 
Address:. Address:. 
GUARANTY 
VALLEY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, a corporat ion, hereinafter referred to as "Bank " , has extended credit and 
agreed to extend credit and /o r furnished or agreed to furnish other accommodations to the person hereinafter identi f ied 
"Bor rower " , and the undersigned Guarantors, in consideration of such credit a n d / o r accommodations by Bank to Borrov 
joint ly and severally guarantee payment when due of any and al l obl igat ions of Borrower to Bank now existing or wh 
may hereafter arise of whatsoever nature and however represented, and whether secured or unsecured. 
This agreement is continuing in nature, it being specifically understood that unless indicated to the contrary at the e 
hereof, the agreement is to encompass future accommodations and indebtednesses of Borrower as wel l as existing indebt* 
nesses of Borrower, and that any obl igat ions or indebtednesses may be changed, modif ied, increased, renewed, paid 
reinstated, al l without notice to the Guarantors or any of them. The l iabi l i ty of any Guarantor for future advances, cred 
or accommodations granted by Bank to Borrower may be terminated by such Guarantor by furnishing writ ten notice 
such termination and , al though this agreement remains in ful l force and effect as to then extant obl igat ions of Borrow 
thereby a l low ing Bank to extend, modify or renew such extant obl igat ions, Guarantor shall not be l iable for new advan 
or addi t ional credits furnished to Borrower subsequent to the date the notice is received by the Bank. This Guaranty sh 
remain in ful l force and effect until terminated in wr i t ing even though from time to time there may be no obl igat ion f 
tween the Borrower and the Bank. 
This agreement is severable as to each Guarantor, it being specifically understood that no one Guarantor is rely 
upon the obl igat ions of any other Guarantor, and Bank may release or modify this agreement in relat ion to the obl igatk 
of one or more Guarantors wi thout affect ing the l iabi l i ty of any other Guarantor. 
Each Guarantor agrees that his Guaranty is binding upon him without the signature of any other person or the e> 
tence of any other Guaranty and that a termination notice served by any other Guarantor shall not affect the l iabi l i ty 
any other Guarantor. 
Each Guarantor agrees to pay al l costs and expenses, including reasonable attorney's fees incurred in enforcing t 
agreement. 
Each Guarantor waives notice of any matter, default , presentment, demand, protest or dishonor between the Borrov* 
and Bank and agrees that any notice furnished to Borrower shall be deemed as being furnished to each Guarantor. Not 
is waived of acceptance hereof by Bank. 
This instrument shall be binding upon the heirs, personal representatives, successors and assigns of the Guarantor c 
shall inure to the benefit of the Bank, its successors and assigns. This contract is assignable in whole or in part without not 
to Guarantors. This wr i t ing contains the entire agreement of the parties. The undersigned specifically submits himself 
the jurisdiction of the District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and agrees that the laws of the State of Utah sh 
govern this contract. If the undersigned is without the territorial jurisdiction of such Court at the time Bank institutes c 
action thereon, then service of process from such Court served on the undersigned, regardless of where undersigned is 
cated, a l lowing sixty (60 ) days to answer such process shall be the only condit ion to the exercise of such jurisdiction 
said Court, the undersigned consenting to and submitting to such jurisdiction. 
A notice to a Guarantor wi l l be deemed complete two (2) days after being placed in the United States Mai l , posta 
prepaid, addressed to the Guarantor at the address indicated after the Guarantor 's signature. 
The l iabi l i ty of each Guarantor is unlimited as to amount unless a l imitation is indicated immediately in advance 
Guarantor 's signature, whereupon the guarantee as to that Guarantor is l imited to the indicated amount. 
The Borrower hereinafter referred to is .....RITE-WAY. CONCRETE. FORMING. INC 
, and if more th 
one Borrower is indicated, the reference "Bor rower " in this agreement is joint and several. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF and by authority duly vested, the undersigned have caused this agreement to be executed 
of this I day of JUNE , 19.17. 
GUARANTORS: 
Limit: Limit: 
fiJ^.M...W^. jyflj£±=iuL 
Guarantor Guarantor 
Address: 56M..S.0.UTH...45.4Q..HESX. Address: 
C A T T T ATT-C mn?\T TTITIATT 
AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) ss. 
PAUL D. VEASY, being duly sworn, says: 
That he Is employed in the office of Biele, Haslam & 
Hatch, P.O. attorneys for Peititioner, Valley Bank and Trust 
Company. 
That he mailed four (4) true and accurate copies of the 
Brief of Petitioner upon the parties to the within described 
action by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope 
addressed to: 
K.K. Mclff, Esq. 
JACKSON, McIFF & MOWER 
Attorneys for Respondents 
151 North Main Street 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
Dwight L. King, Esq. 
Attorney for Draper Bank 
and Trust 
2121 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Arthur H. Nielsen, Esq. 
Richard Hincks, Esq. 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Attorneys for Jacobsen-Robbins 
Construction Company 
Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Arthur F. Sandack 
Attorney for Tracy Jones 
370 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and by mailing the same with the United States Post Office, first 
class, postage prepaid, on the 3o> day of September, 1987. 
^i-cOy. 
• = * — - • 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 
September, 1987. 
f^cAiay of CJ 
My Commission Exp i res : ^%?^<£ C&>tv^Z<rfs 
